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within forty feet of the Plaintiff's residence.

The matters as

to damages on both the complaint and the counterclaim were dismissed by mutual stipulation of the parties.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant requests the Supreme Court of Utah to
reverse the decision of the lower court and to rule for the
Defendant on said summary judgment motions.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is admitted that Defendant owned two dogs at the time
the complaint was filed.

Shortly thereafter and for many months

prior to the decision of the lower court, Defendant owned only
one dog.

This dog was sometimes kept in a pen eighteen (18) feet

by forty-four (44) feet a portion of which was within forty (40)
feet of an occupied dwelling owned by the Plaintiff.

All other

allegations of Plaintiff's complaint and affidavits are denied
both in Defendant's answer and in Defendant's affidavit in support
of her motion for summary judgment.
In addition, there are facts in dispute as for example
Plaintiff's claim that Defendants maintained said dogs as a
commercial establishment; however, no proof was ever offered to
establish this and Plaintiff's affidavit says merely that "she
has been informed of efforts by the Defendants to establish" such
this in the face of Defendant's denials of anything other than
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that the dog or dogs were household pets.

In any event, Defen-

dant does not believe that the lower Court considered any of the
disputed matters in rendering its decision but considered only
the fact that Defendant did have a dog or at one time two dogs
which was occasionally maintained in a pen within forty feet of
a dwelling.

If the Court did consider these disputed matters,

that would be error because not only did the allegations of Plaintiff's affidavit and complaint constitute mere assertions without
any support, but these would be matters for a trier of fact to
determine in any event.

It should also be pointed out with re-

spect to the facts that although there was reference in Plaintiff's
complaint to problems relating to droppings, barking, fouling of
the air and the like, there was no evidence in the form of affidavit or otherwise before the Court respecting said assertions,
and likewise these would be questions of fact for a trier of fact
in any event.
It is stipulated that the property lies within zoning
R-2-10H.

ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT SECTION
22-2-16, REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, PROHIBIT THE
CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT.
The ordinance in question provides as follows:
No animals or fowl shall be kept or maintained closer than
forty (40) feet from any dwelling, and no barn, stable,
coop, pen or corral shall be kept closer than forty (40)
feet from any street, except that in Residential Zone R-3L
no corral or stable for the keeping of horses may be located
closer to a public street or to any dwelling than one hundred (100) feet.
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If one takes the first sentence of the above ordinance
literally, then almost everyone in Salt Lake County is in violation of it; and it would appear that that is what would follow
from the lower Court's ruling since admittedly a dog is an animal
and admittedly it is within forty feet of a dwelling.

Actually,

human beings are also part of "animals", and they are maintained
in dwellings.

This is not intended to be facetious, but merely

to illustrate that the word animal depending on its context and
purpose of the particular writing, may have different definitions.
Because a dog is obviously an animal doesn't mean they have to be
kept more than forty feet away from a dwelling.

Obviously, the

ordinance has reference to those animals generally referred to as
livestock.

Notice that the rest of the sentence refers to barns,

stables, coops, pens and corrals.

This ordinance could hardly

be used to prevent a homeowner from keeping a canary in his kitchen,
and yet if applied the way the lower Court did in this case, that
is the result that follows.
Fortunately, there are other enactments which lend some
assistance in interpreting Section 22-2-16 the way the defendant
suggests above.

Under the applicable zoning, R-2-10H, Section

22-19-2(4) permits the keeping of "household pets, the keeping
of not more than four horses for private use only and not for
rental".

Section 22-1-6(38) defines household pets as "animals

and/or fowl ordinarily permitted in the house and kept for company or pleasure such as dogs, cats, and canaries, including not
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more than two (2) dogs or two (2) cats over four (4) months of
age and not more than a total of four (4) animals.

Household

pets does not include inherently or potentially dangerous animals,
fowls, or reptiles."

This definition is very enlightening in that

it discusses the fact that there would be different types of animals, i.e. refers to animals or fowl ordinarily permitted in the
house or kept for company or pleasure such as dogs etc.

Is De-

fendant asking too much to say that Section 22-2-16 is also descriptive of a particular group of animals, which group in fact
excludes those defined in Section 22-1-6(38) as household pets.
Although it is not entirely clear from the lower Court's
ruling, some of the conversation that took place at the time of
the hearing indicated that the lower Court may have felt that because the Defendant's dog comes under the definition of a permitted
household pet, it would be permissible to have the dog within forty
feet of a residence including the Defendant's residence, and in
fact inside Defendant's residence as long as it was not maintained
in a separate pen, any portion of which was within forty feet of
a dwelling.

In other words, the lower court seemed to say that

it was permissible to have the dog run loose in the entire yard
of the Defendant so long as it was not penned in a dog run a portion of which was within forty feet of Plaintiff's dwelling.

This

argument is unsound because all it really says is that if your pen
is as big as your whole yard it is lawful even though the dog may
come within one or two feet of a dwelling, and in the instance
case, within approximately eight feet of the Plaintiff's dwelling.
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But how does that get around the ordinance?

The dog is still an

animal and his pen is still within forty feet of the plaintiff's
dwelling and he is still kept or maintained in it. Obviously,
there is really only two ways to interpret the ordinance:

The

Court must interpret it literally and then everyone who has a
canary or kitten must keep them forty feet away from their own
home as well as their neighbors homes, or the court must accept
the interpretation described above that just as in Section 22-1-6(38)
where household pets are described as a particular type of animal, Section 22-2-16 also refers to a particular type of animal
which does not include household pets i.e. dogs, etc.

Another

reason to adopt the interpretation suggested by the defendant is
that to hold to the language literally would completely annihilate
the other sections quoted relating to the permitting of household
i

pets in and around homes. Defendant is informed that these sections were enacted after the ordinance in questionf therefore
believes they should be given greater effect.

CONCLUSION
The granting of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
was in error and should be reversed.

Defendant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on her motion for summary judgment.
T

Respectfully submitted,

Inagene D. Shipley, Pro se
Defendant and Appellant
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